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Abstract: The existing fisheries economics literature analyzes compliance problems by treating the 
fishing firm as one cohesive unit, but in many cases, violations are committed by agents acting on behalf 
of a firm. To account for this, we analyze the principal-agent relationship within the fishing firm. In the 
case where the firm directly benefits from illegal fishing, the firm must induce its crew to violate 
regulations through the incentive scheme. Within this framework, we analyze how the allocation of 
liability between fishing firms and crew affects quota violations and the ability to design a socially 
efficient fisheries policy. We show that without wage frictions, it does not matter whom is held liable. 
However, under the commonly used share systems of remuneration, crew liability generally yields a 
more efficient outcome than firm liability. Furthermore, asset restrictions may affect the outcome under 
various liability rules.  
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1. Introduction 
Unreported landings and other violations of fisheries regulations represent a challenge in most 
commercial fisheries. Due to the common-property nature of fisheries, over-fishing and rent 
dissipation are serious problems. To avoid rent dissipation, managers typically impose 
regulations to restrict fishing effort and harvest levels. However, this does not remove the 
individual firm’s incentives to harvest in excess of socially optimal levels, and hence, the 
fishing firm may have incentives to violate the regulations.  
In this paper, we ask how the allocation of liability for regulatory violations, between the 
fishing firm (or the owner) and its employees, affects the level of compliance. While the firm 
owns any landed fish and thus benefits directly from, for example, quota violations, the payoff 
for the employees, who make the actual harvesting decision, primarily depend on the 
compensation scheme offered by the firm. To analyze the implications of this potential conflict 
of interest for regulatory compliance, we use principal-agent theory to investigate the 
relationship between the firm and the employees in the context of a vessel that can (illegally) 
exceed its fishing quota. We then integrate this into the economic model of crime. This extends 
the existing literature on fisheries law enforcement as it broadens the understanding of illegal 
behavior and the role of liability rules. Such knowledge is valuable also from a policy 
perspective, as it might enable regulators to increase the deterrence effect of the enforcement 
system without spending more resources. 
Our analysis shows that when the firm has full flexibility in designing wage contracts the 
allocation of liability between firm and crew does not matter. Furthermore, we show that if we 
introduce wage frictions, so that firms no longer have full flexibility in designing wage 
contracts, the allocation of liability might matter. To investigate this in the context of fisheries, 
we study two specifications of the commonly used share-system of remuneration: profit sharing 
and revenue sharing. With such sharing rules, the firm must pay the crew a share of the vessel’s 
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profits or revenues, which dramatically reduces the flexibility of the firm in designing 
incentives schemes. Consequently, the firm can no longer induce the employee to harvest any 
desired quantity, and consequently, it matters whether one holds the firm or the crew liable for 
violations. We also show how wage frictions in the form of limited assets for either the firm or 
the employee may prevent the possibility of designing an efficient enforcement policy.  
The result that liability does not matter in the absence of wage (or other) frictions, is in line 
with the environmental economics literature on liability. However, while this literature 
typically assumes a static flow externality, where pollution (flow) is an undesirable output  
(Sappington, 1983; Segerson and Tietenberg, 1992; Bontems et al., 2004; de Vries and 
Franckx, 2012), we consider a dynamic stock externality. The dynamic stock externality arises 
within our framework because neither the firm nor the employees take into account how their 
harvest decisions affect the future availability of fish (the resource restriction). With a dynamic 
stock externality, the marginal cost of illegal harvesting, and thus the optimal enforcement, 
depends on the current status of the stock and will therefore change over time until a steady 
state is reached. In contrast, the existing literature on liability generally considers static 
policies.  
Our framework uses the economic model of crime by Becker (1968), which has formed the 
basis for much of the previous work on noncompliance both in the fisheries economics 
literature and beyond. The fishing firm violates fishing regulations if the expected gains exceed 
the expected punishment (Sutinen and Anderson, 1985; Furlong, 1991; Hatcher, 2009; 
Arnason, 2013). In this previous work, one can align the incentives of risk neutral fishing firms 
with those of a social planner by setting the expected penalty equal to the external cost of illegal 
landings (Anderson and Lee, 1986; Coelho, 2012; Arnason, 2013). The fisheries economic 
literature presents many extensions of this basic enforcement model but all previous studies 
have in common that they treat the fishing firm as an individual decision maker. Consequently, 
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they disregard any principal-agent problems between the firm and the employees, and what 
happens within the firm is not part of the analysis.1 Hence, our analysis extends this work by 
also investigating what happens within the firm. 
A large literature analyzes corporate crime within a principal-agent framework (Mullin and 
Snyder, 2005; Mullin and Snyder, 2010). The majority of this literature studies the case when 
the employee acts in his own best interest when committing a corporate crime. However, in the 
case of the fishery, the opposite situation seems more plausible. The fishing firm owns any fish 
caught and therefore obtains direct benefits from quota violations. The benefits of the crew, in 
contrast, mainly rely on the compensation or salary scheme offered by the firm.2 Few studies 
analyze this setup, but exceptions include the work by Mullin and Snyder (2005) and (2010). 
They develop a corporate-crime model in which the firm benefits from violations carried out 
by the employees, while the employees obtain no direct benefit from the corporate crime. 
Within this model, they analyze optimal sanctioning and investigate under what circumstances 
a regulator should punish employees, the firm, or both parties for corporate crimes. They focus 
particularly on the role of indemnification clauses in the contract between the firm and the 
employee and ask whether one should ban such clauses. In this paper, we show that 
indemnification clauses for employees generally are efficient in fisheries. However, if the firm 
faces a binding asset constraint, indemnification clauses have no effect. 
There are many examples of employees making decisions on behalf of a firm, including 
decisions to violate regulations (Kornhauser, 1982; Arlen, 2013). In terms of fisheries, this is 
perhaps particularly relevant in large-scale fisheries, where firms own vessels and often employ 
                                                     
1 Nøstbakken (2008) contains an overview of the fisheries economic literature on law enforcement. 
2 We disregard the possibility that employees fish illegally using the firm’s equipment and sell these illegal catches 
themselves. 
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a large crew of professional fishermen. In many cases, the owners of the fishing firms do not 
work onboard the vessels, but function as managers from shore or investors. In our analysis, 
we assume perfect information between the firm, on the one hand, and the skipper and crew on 
the other. One might argue that if mangers act from the shore, there might be asymmetric 
information and strategic behavior between the principal and the agent. However, in this 
context, we believe the assumptions of full information and absence of strategic behavior are 
justified since they allow us to focus more closely on the effects of the liability allocation 
between the firm and the crew. This is also a common approach in the general economic 
liability literature (Segerson and Tietenberg, 1992; de Vries and Franckx, 2012). 
Our study also relates to the work on remuneration systems in fisheries (Bergland, 1995; 
Matthiasson, 1999; Nguyen and Leung, 2009; Thuy et al., 2013). This work primarily focuses 
on how a fishing firm should specify the share system so that the crew acts in the firm’s best 
interest. A commonly used argument in the literature is that firms use inputs most efficiently if 
the cost and revenue shares are equal. Bergland (1995) and Thuy et al. (2013) show that this 
only holds if agents are risk-neutral and if the relative size of the share parameters does not 
influence willingness of the employees to supply effort. Matthiasson (1999), and Nguyen and 
Leung (2009) analyze the case when employees face agent specific costs and conclude that the 
firm prefers a remuneration contract with a positive revenue share and a zero cost share. While 
we analyze the share system of remuneration, our focus is on which liability rules maximizes 
the value of the fishery given specific remuneration schemes. Nonetheless, in line with this 
literature, we find that profit sharing more often than revenue sharing can yield an efficient 
outcome, since it forces employees to at least take some of the costs of the firm into account 
when making (corporate) harvesting decisions. 
A related strand of the literature considers optimal regulation of fisheries under asymmetric 
information about various parts of the fisheries system (Jensen and Vestergaard, 2002a, 2002b, 
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2007; Hansen et al., 2006; Aanesen and Armstrong, 2013).3 Jensen and Vestergaard (2002a) 
assume asymmetric information about individual catches due to illegal landings and discards, 
and show how a stock tax can secure a first-best optimum when stock size is perfectly 
observable. Jensen and Vestergaard (2007) extend this analysis and show that with stock 
uncertainty, the stock tax must be combined with a tax on self-reported harvest. As an 
alternative to the stock-based tax, Hansen et al. (2006) suggest a tax on aggregated harvest. A 
more direct application of principal-agent theory is Jensen and Vestergaard (2002b), who 
assume asymmetric information about an exogenous cost parameter (adverse selection). They 
consider a state-owner fishery and show that a subsidy on fishing effort can secure a second-
best optimum. Aanesen and Armstrong (2013) also consider asymmetric information about a 
cost parameter, with effort as a regulatory variable. Their focus is on the influence of 
environmental groups in fisheries, and show that effort taxation can secure a second-best 
optimum. All of the above papers consider regulation under asymmetric information and 
therefore focus on the principal-agent relation between a social planner and the fishermen. In 
this paper, we focus on optimal liability, and hence, the principal-agent relationship between 
the employees and the firm. The social planner now influence the decisions of both the 
employees and the firm through liability rules. Hence, we contribute to this literature by 
primarily focusing on liability rules rather than optimal regulations. 
The organization of the paper is as follows. In the next section, we develop and analyze the 
base model. Section 3 contains an extension of this model by introducing wage frictions and 
relaxing the assumption about firms and employees having unlimited financial assets, while 
the final section offers some concluding remarks. 
                                                     
3 An overview of the literature on optimal regulation of fisheries under asymmetric information is given by 
Vestergaard (2010). 
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2. The Model and the Basic Result 
We start out by developing the basic model. A fishery manager (social planner) determines an 
individual quota for each vessel at each instant of time, t, along with an enforcement policy. 
The fishery manager enforces quotas by inspecting random vessels. We assume that each 
fishing firm owns only one vessel. If a vessel exceeds the quota, it faces a given fine provided 
the manager detects the violation. The fine is costless and can be imposed either on the firm 
(the principal), the employees (the agent), or shared between the two. We assume perfect 
information between principal and agent to keep the analysis of liability rules tractable. Finally, 
we adopt a single-species assumption, and thus, disregard by-catches. However, it is 
straightforward to extend our model to account for multiple species. 
Note that while we model an output regulated fishery in the following, it would be 
straightforward to modify our model to the case of input regulations. To see this, note that a 
dual formulation of a maximization problem can be transformed into a primal formulation of 
the problem (inputs) by using a standard, neoclassical production function with fishing effort 
and stock size as arguments (Neher, 1990). Hence, we can discuss input regulations based on 
the primal formulation of the problem, and, due to the relationship between the primal 
formulation and the dual formulation of the problem, the basic results in this paper generalize 
to the case of input regulations. This is particularly relevant for fisheries management in 
developing countries, which commonly rely on input regulations as the main management 
instrument, although individual quotas are gaining ground also in developing world fisheries 
(Jardine and Sanchirico, 2012).  
We start out by analyzing the decentralized (private) outcome. Next, we compare this to the 
optimal harvesting policy found by solving a social planner’s problem. In the decentralized 
case, firms design compensation schemes to maximize profits net of fine payments given the 
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quotas, stock level, and enforcement policy, while employees decide how much to harvest 
given the compensation scheme and other relevant factors. The social planner, on the other 
hand, chooses the quota policy and the enforcement effort to maximize total rent from the 
fishery, where the enforcement effort, in turn, determines the detection rate for over-quota 
harvests. Note, however, that the firm and the fishermen take the detection rate as given. 
 
2.1 Private outcome 
We let Lth  denote legal landings at time t , while Ith  denotes illegal landings. The employees 
determine the total harvest level, Lth  and Ith , given the wage contract offered by the firm. With 
full flexibility in designing the wage scheme, the firm can make the wage scheme contingent 
on both legal and illegal landings, implying a wage scheme:  ,Lt ItW h h . We assume that the 
employees and the firm each bear a share of the total harvest costs, which is given by 
( , , )Lt It tc h h x . Given this, we can express the cost of the employees as ),,( tItLt xhhc , where 
0 1   is the employee’s exogenous cost share. 4  The harvest cost function has the following 
properties: 0
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. These properties ensure that the problem is well behaved, and they will later help 
us characterize the properties of the enforcement cost function. The assumptions reflect that it 
                                                     
4 Alternatively, we can assume separate cost functions for firm and employees, but this will not affect our main 
results. With a fully flexible wage function, the separate cost function for the employee will enter the firm’s 
participation restriction (equation (3)) and thereby the firm’s objective function (equation (4)). Thus, the results 
presented in the following are not affected by the assumption about the cost functions. When we analyze the share 
system of remuneration in section 3.1, we show that the employee is the real decision maker, and hence, the 
assumption about the cost function does not affect the results in this case either. 
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is costly for the employees to work onboard the vessel, and higher landings and lower stock 
sizes require that employees exert more effort.  
 
When a vessel exceeds the quota, it risks being penalized. Depending on the liability rule, either 
the firm, the employee or both may then face a fine. Let   0ItG h   and   0ItF h   denote 
employee’s and the firm’s fines, respectively. Both penalty functions are zero in absence of 
illegal landings (F(0) = 0 and G(0) = 0), and increases exponentially with the level of illegal 
landings. In the base model, we assume that any value of  ItG h  and  ItF h  can be paid by 
the employee and the firm, respectively. The probability of detecting violators, ( ) 0,te   is a 
function of enforcement effort, te , exerted by the regulator, but the probability is taken as given 
by the industry. Therefore, an employee’s expected punishment if the vessel violates the quota 
is ( )ItG h . In the following, we analyze the behavior of a representative vessel (firm and 
employees). We start out by looking at the behavior of employees. 
The expected payoff of a risk-neutral employee is: 
 ( , ) ( , , ) ( )Lt It Lt It t ItW h h c h h x G h     (1) 
Hence, the employee earns a wage, but incurs a share of the harvesting cost and must pay the 
expected penalty for harvesting in excess of the quota. 
The firm knows the expected payoff function of the employees and can observe both legal and 
illegal harvest. Thus, under standard assumptions about the properties of the cost function, and 
a flexible wage function, the fishing firm can use the compensation scheme to induce the 
employees to land any given quantity (Laffont and Tirole, 1993). In the base model, we impose 
no restrictions on the wage function, and hence, the principal can indirectly determine landings 
through the choice of the wage function. This makes the principal the real decision maker and 
therefore we turn to the optimization problem of the firm.   
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We assume that firms (and employees) are myopic, and do not consider the implications of 
their harvest decisions on the evolution of the stock. This is reasonable in a common property 
resource setting with many resource users, which implies that each user has only a negligible 
impact on the stock, and is a standard assumption in common property resource models (Clark, 
1990; Neher, 1990). Given this, the firm maximizes profits with the parameters of the wage 
function as control variables. However, since the firm can indirectly determine both legal and 
illegal landings, we can simply use these landings directly as control variables instead of the 
wage function. Given that the firm faces the same probability of detection as the employees, 
the firm’s expected penalty is ( )ItF h . On this basis, we can express the maximization problem 
of the risk-neutral firm as: 
  
,
max ( ) (1 ) ( , , ) ( , ) ( )
Lt It
Lt It Lt It t Lt It It
h h
p h h c h h x W h h F h       (2) 
           Subject to 
 Lt th Q  (3) 
 0( , ) ( , , ) ( )Lt It Lt It t ItW h h c h h x G h U     (4) 
where p  is the output price,5 tQ  is the individual quota, and 
0U  is the reservation payoff of 
the crew.  
 
Note from the objective function (2) that the firm, just like the employees, only incurs a fraction 
of the total costs. Condition (3) is a quota restriction that captures that total legal landings 
cannot exceed the quota. This restriction will always be binding when we focus on the case 
                                                     
5 Note also that we assume that firms obtain the same output price for fish landed illegally and legally. In reality, 
the marginal private value (price) of illegal landings may be lower than the price of legal landings, because of, for 
example suboptimal handling and processing of illegal landings. However, the analysis generalizes easily to the 
case where the price of legal landings differs from that of illegal landings. 
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where the firm harvests both legally and illegally (which is what we are interested in here). 
Condition (4) is a participation constraint, which expresses that agents must receive at least 
their reservation payoff, 
0U , to participate. Thus, condition (4) implies that the firm wants the 
employees to work onboard the vessel.  
Note that since the wage function enters with a negative sign in the firm’s objective function, 
condition (4) will always bind. This implies that: 
 0( , ) ( , , ) ( )Lt It Lt It t ItW h h U c h h x G h     (5) 
Equation (5) shows that the wage covers the employees’ reservation payoff, their costs of 
working on board the vessel, and their expected penalty. From this, it follows that the firm 
insures the agent against all costs. One might argue that the employees should be able to 
increase the payoff by changing the harvested quantity. However, since there are no wage 
frictions in the base model, the firm will design a wage contract that ensures that the employees 
obtains the highest possible expected payoff by doing exactly what the principal wants them to 
do. Consequently, changing the harvest quantities away from the firm’s desired level can only 
reduce the employees’ expected payoff. In section 3.1 we show that this is no longer the case 
if the wage function is constrained. 
Returning to the optimization problem of the firm, we can substitute (5) into (2), yielding the 
following modified maximization problem: 
   0
,
max ( ) ( , , ) ( ) ( )
Lt It
Lt It Lt It t It It
h h
p h h c h h x U G h F h     , (6) 
which must satisfy the quota constraint given by (3). 
Assuming a binding quota restriction, implying that the firm considers illegal landings, the 
Lagrangian of the maximization problem in (6) and (3) becomes: 
  0( ) ( , , ) ( ) ( ) ( )Lt It Lt It t It It t t LtL p h h c h h x U G h F h Q h          (7) 
where t  is a Lagrange multiplier that measures the shadow price of the quota restriction. 
  
11 
 
 
The first-order conditions with respect to legal and illegal landings, Lth  and Ith , are: 
 0t
Lt Lt
L c
p
h h

 
   
 
 (8) 
  ( ) ( ) 0It It
It It
L c
p F h G h
h h

 
     
 
 (9) 
Both conditions (8) and (9) state that the marginal private benefit of landings, p , must equal 
the marginal private costs. The marginal private cost of legal landings (equation (8)) consists 
of the marginal production costs of firm and employee, Ltc h  , and the shadow price of the 
quota constraint, t . The marginal private cost of illegal landings (equation (9)) consists of the 
marginal production cost, and the marginal expected penalties of firm and employee. Note that 
the production costs and expected penalties of both firm and employees are included because 
the principal fully covers the costs of the agent. 
Conditions (8) and (9) allow us to derive illegal harvest as a function of the inspection rate, the 
quota (legal harvest), and the stock. This relationship is given by  , ,It It t th h Q x , which can 
be considered the reaction function of the firm. It is straightforward to show that, given the 
properties of the harvest cost function, ( , , )Lt It tc h h x ,  and the penalty functions,  ItF h  and 
 ItG h , we must have that 0
It
t
h
x



, 0It
h




, and 0It
t
h
Q



.6  
We can now derive society’s enforcement cost function from the reaction function of the firm. 
We first invert the reaction function of the firm, which yields  , ,it t th Q x  . The inverted 
reaction function describes the link between the probability of being detected, illegal landings, 
                                                     
6 The proofs for sign of these derivatives are available in the appendix. 
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stock size, and the quota.7 Next, recall that ( )te  describes the relationship between the 
probability of being detected and enforcement effort, with 0
te



. We can invert ( )te  to get 
( )te  , and by substituting in the inverted reaction function we get: 
( ( , , )) ( , , )t t it t t it t te e h Q x h Q x   . Finally, we introduce an enforcement cost function that 
depends on enforcement effort, ( )tK e , which we assume is increasing and convex in 
enforcement effort: 0
t
K
e



 and 
2
2
0
t
K
e



. Now, we can substitute ( , , )t it t te h Q x  into the 
enforcement cost function, which yields ( ) ( ( ( , , ))) ( , , )t t it t t it t tK e K e h Q x E h Q x  . Thus, we 
have established that the total enforcement cost depends on the level of illegal landings, the 
quota, and the availability of fish. Given that the properties of the firm’s reaction function, and 
particularly that 0
te



, and the properties of the enforcement cost function, we have that  
0
t
E
x



, 0
t
E
Q



, and 0
It
E
h



.8 Thus, all else equal, allowing for higher illegal landings 
implies a reduction in enforcement costs, while a larger stock leads to an increase in 
enforcement costs, all else equal. Finally, a higher quota reduces the enforcement costs. We 
will make use of the properties of the enforcement cost function when we analyze the social 
planner case below. 
                                                     
7 If we, for example, assume a given stock size and quota, the inverted reaction function describes the necessary 
probability of being detected to achieve a given level of illegal landings. 
8 We provide a detailed description of how we derive the enforcement cost function and its properties in the 
appendix.  
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2.2 Social planner problem 
To find optimal aggregate illegal and legal landings at time t , Ith  and Lth , we let a social 
planner maximize the present value of future resource rents for a representative vessel (firm) 
net of enforcement costs. Note that we include the full value of illegal landings in the welfare 
function, in line with Milliman (1986) and Lewin and Trumbull (1990) who conclude that the 
social planner should account for the value of regulatory offences in their analyses of the social 
value of criminal gains. Furthermore, we assume costless fines. On this basis, we can formulate 
the maximization problem of the social planner, with legal and illegal landings as control 
variables, and stock size, tx , as the state variable:
9  
  
,
0
max ( ) ( , , ) ( , , )
Lt It
t
Lt It Lt It t It Lt t
h h
t
p h h c h h x E h h x e dt



   , (10) 
   s.t. 
  t Lt It tf x h h x   , (11) 
where 0   is the discount rate, and  tf x is a natural growth function. In equation (10), the 
enforcement cost function takes into account the behavioral response of the fishing firms to 
changes in the quota (legal harvest) and the stock size, and the corresponding impact of these 
variables on the enforcement costs to achieve a given combination of legal and illegal landings. 
We have already established that 0
It
E
h



. In addition, we assume that the enforcement cost 
function is convex in the reduction of illegal landings, 
2
2
0
It
E
h



. Furthermore, it is never 
                                                     
9 One might argue that it would be more appropriate in light of real-world fisheries management to let Qt,, and 
not hLt be the control variable. However, from section 2.1, we have that hLt = Qt. In addition, it is useful to have 
the same control variable in sections 2.1 and 2.2. Thus, we chose to use hLt as the control variable throughout. 
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optimal to eliminate all illegal harvesting:
0
 lim  ( )
It
It
h
e h

  . The resource restriction (11) states 
that the change in stock size ( tx ) must equal the natural growth of the fish stock net of 
harvesting. For the natural growth function, we assume   0tf x   for 0 msyx x  , and 
  0tf x   for  msyx x , where msyx is the stock size corresponding with the maximum 
sustainable yield, and finally that ( ) 0tf x  . A standard logistic growth function satisfies 
these assumptions. The problem given by (10) and (11) gives an accurate representation of how 
a socially optimal quota ( Lth ) should be determined.  
Efforts to hide illegal activities (avoidance) and similar costly activities related to illegal 
harvesting may create differences in harvest costs between legal and illegal fishing. Hence, the 
presence of such costs implies that we should separate between legal and illegal harvests in the 
cost function. Furthermore, if quota enforcement did not cost anything, the social planner 
would eliminate all illegal harvesting in the social optimum, to avoid avoidance costs and 
similarly incurred by illegal activity. However, in our model, as in real world fisheries (Arnason 
et al., 2000), enforcement costs play a significant role. It typically becomes increasingly costly 
to raise the detection rate marginally, and it is usually suboptimal to increase the detection rate 
to a level that fully deters violations. We therefore focus on the case with imperfect 
enforcement and quota violations in the following.  
The current-value Hamiltonian of the problem defined by (10) and (11) is: 
        , , , , ( )Lt It Lt It t Lt It t t t It LtH p h h c h h x E h h x f x h h        (12) 
where t  is a co-state variable that measures the marginal cost of the dynamic stock externality. 
Note that this marginal cost depends on the current stock size, and will thus change over time 
unless the fishery is in a steady-state equilibrium. Given our focus on non-compliance and 
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liability, it is sufficient to state the optimality conditions for the control variables (legal and 
illegal landings): 
 0t
Lt Lt Lt
H c E
p
h h h

  
    
  
 (13) 
 0t
It It It
H c E
p
h h h

  
    
  
 (14) 
Conditions (13) and (14) state that the marginal social benefit, tp , equals the total marginal 
social costs of legal and illegal landings, respectively. For both legal and illegal landings, the 
total marginal social cost consists of the marginal harvest cost ( tc h  , with ,t Lt Ith h h ), the 
marginal enforcement cost ( tE h  , with ,t Lt Ith h h ), and the marginal cost of the dynamic 
stock externality. Note that condition (13) is the condition for the optimal quota (legal 
landings), while (14) can be interpreted as the condition for optimal enforcement (illegal 
landings). Because of a non-constant t over time, the optimal enforcement policy changes over 
time. 
Above, we mentioned that due to for example avoidance costs, illegal fishing might be costlier 
than legal fishing. However, if enforcement costs are sufficiently high for it to be socially 
undesirable to fully deter all quota violations, there will be an interior solution involving both 
illegal and legal landings. Using this, we can use equations (13) and (14) to obtain a relationship 
between legal and illegal landings given by 
Lt Lt It It
c E c E
h h h h
   
  
   
. Hence, in the social 
optimum, the total marginal social cost (harvesting cost and enforcement cost) must be the 
same for legal and illegal landings. 
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2.3 Optimal liability 
We can now compare the optimality conditions of the private and the social planner problems 
to investigate under which conditions the private solution is also socially optimal. Let us first 
consider legal landings, given by conditions (8) and (13). Alignment of social and private legal 
landings requires that:10 
 t t
Lt
E
h
 

 

, (15) 
Condition (15) implies that the firm’s shadow price of the quota constraint, t , must equal the 
marginal enforcement cost of the quota (legal landings) plus the marginal cost of the dynamic 
stock externality, t . This will generally not hold in a decentralized fishery, but can be achieved 
through regulations. In the absence of enforcement costs ( 0)
Lt
E
h



, we obtain that t t  . 
From section 2.1, we have that 0
Lt t
E E
h Q
 
 
 
, which means that (15) implies that 
t t  . 
Thus Qt is larger with enforcement cost than without these costs, and this is explained by the 
fact that an increase in the quota reduces illegal landings, and thus, the enforcement costs.  
Let us next analyze illegal landings. From the perspective of the social planner, the detection 
probability in the private optimality condition for illegal landings (9), depends on the exerted 
enforcement effort. From section 2.1, we have that enforcement effort in turn can be expressed 
as a function of stock size, legal and illegal landings, which implies that 
   ( , , ) , ,Lt It t Lt It th h x h h x     . Then, by comparing conditions (9) and (14), we find that 
alignment of private and socially optimal illegal landings requires: 
                                                     
10 Note that hLt = Qt, which implies that 
Lt t
E E
h Q
 
 
 . 
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   , , ( ) ( )It Lt t It It t
It
E
h h x F h G h
h
 

   

.   (16) 
Thus, the social planner must set the expected punishment so that the marginal enforcement 
cost of illegal landings plus the marginal cost of the dynamic stock externality equal the 
expected value of the marginal penalty for both firm and employee.11 Since t varies over time, 
we get from (16) that the optimal fine policy varies over time. We can calculate the optimal 
quotas and illegal landings by solving the equation system given by equations (15) and (16) for 
Ith  and Lth . This, in turn, enables us to find the optimal enforcement level as a function of the 
optimal legal and illegal landings, and the current stock level. Finally, note that (15) and (16) 
represent a first-best optimum since there are no frictions in the wage function between firm 
and employees. 
With this in place, we can investigate the implications of the allocation of liability. The mixed 
liability case is already reflected by equations (15) and (16). With full firm and full employee 
liability, respectively, either the employee pays no fine (     0It ItG h G h  ) or the firm pays 
no fine (     0It ItF h F h  ). Hence, in the case of full firm liability, equation (16) reduces 
to: 
  , , ( )It Lt t It t
It
E
h h x F h
h
 

  

, (17) 
while in the case of full employee liability, equation (16) reduces to: 
  , , ( )It Lt t It t
It
E
h h x G h
h
 

  

. (18) 
                                                     
11 This result might be more likely to hold with fees than with quotas. Optimality with fees of legal and illegal 
landings requires that the fee is equal to the shadow price of the fish stock (Laffont and Tirole, 1993). 
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Regardless of the liability allocation, equation (16) remains unchanged. Equations (17) and 
(18), along with equations (15) and (16), show that a social planner can achieve a first-best 
solution under mixed liability, full firm liability, and full employee liability. Hence, the liability 
allocation does not matter. Regardless of whom the legal system holds liable for quota 
violations, the social planner can set the enforcement effort and the quota to secure an optimal 
outcome. The reason is the lack of frictions in the base. Hence, regardless of liability allocation, 
the firm can shift all relevant costs (including expected fines) fully between the firm and the 
employees, thereby leaving the employees equally well of regardless of the formal liability 
rule, at least in expectation terms. 
Our main result thus far is therefore that we can reach a social optimum regardless of which 
actor the legal system holds liable for illegal landings. As mentioned above, the environmental 
economics literature reaches similar results assuming a static flow externality (Segerson and 
Tietenberg, 1992; de Vries and Franckx, 2012). However, we assume a dynamic stock 
externality by including a dynamic resource restriction, which represents a new contribution to 
this literature. Indeed, our analysis shows that the dynamic stock externality, and thus the status 
of the resource stock, affects the optimal quota and enforcement policy. Hence, the optimal 
policy in our study varies over time in contrast to the static policy considered in previous work. 
The lack of frictions in our model drives our liability-irrelevance result, and particularly the 
assumptions that firms have full flexibility in specifying wage functions. Hence, the firm can 
dictate the behavior of its employees, while the regulator can dictate the behavior of the fishing 
firms. In the next section, we consider the consequences of introducing wage frictions between 
firm and employee through restrictions on the wage functions, and of assuming limited 
financial assets for firm and/or employees that diminishes the deterrence effect of fines. We 
show that social optimality relies critically on the firm’s ability to shift the fine penalty to the 
employee.  
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3. Extending the Benchmark Model 
In the benchmark model, we assumed the firm have full flexibility when specifying the wage 
contract, and that both firm and employees had the necessary financial means to pay any fine. 
In this section, we relax these assumptions. We start out by analyzing the implications of 
compensating the employees according to the share-of-profit or share-of-revenue rules.12 
Sharing rules are commonly used remuneration schemes in fisheries, and we consider two of 
the more frequently used specifications. In the treatment of sharing rules, we continue to 
assume that firms and employees have the financial means to pay any fine. However, in section 
3.2, we analyze the implications of imposing asset limitations in the base model. 
 
3.1 The share system of remuneration 
Before we implement the share systems of remuneration in the base model, it is useful to 
investigate how the firm induces the employees to harvest the desired quantity. Recall that we 
did not do this in the analysis of the base model, since we established that with full flexibility 
in designing the wage contract, the firm could induce its employees to harvest any quantity. 
Hence, we could do the analysis without analyzing exactly how the firm induced its firm to 
behave in a certain way.  
The Lagrange function of the maximization problem of the employees is: 
        , , ,e Lt It Lt It t It t t LtL W h h c h h x G h u Q h      , (19) 
                                                     
12 Our focus in this section is on the socially optimal design of liability rules given a certain sharing rule. Therefore, 
our analysis differs from the principal-agent literature on remuneration schemes in fisheries (Bergland, 1995; 
Matthiasson, 1999; Nguyen and Leung, 2009; Thue et al., 2013). 
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where tu  is the employees’ shadow price of the quota constraint.
13 Thus, the employees also 
account for the quota restriction. The employees’ first order conditions for legal and illegal 
landings are: 
 0e t
Lt Lt Lt
L W c
u
h h h

  
   
  
 (20) 
  ´ 0e It
It It It
L W c
G h
h h h
 
  
   
  
 (21) 
Assuming, as in the base model, that the quota constraint binds ( Lt th Q ), equation (20) 
determines legal landings. In addition, and as discussed above, the employees’ participation 
constraint must hold. Hence, the fishing firm can determine the appropriate compensation 
scheme by ensuring that the reaction functions of the employees for legal and illegal landings 
(equations (20) and (21)) correspond with the firm’s optimal levels of legal and illegal landings 
(equations (8) and (9)).  
With restrictions on the wage function, the firm might no longer be able to induce the 
employees to harvest any desired quantity. If this is the case, equations (20) and (21) will 
determine the harvest quantity rather than equations (8) and (9) as in the base model. Under 
the share-of-profit system, the employees receive a share of the firm’s profits from the fishing 
operation, while they receive a share of revenues in the share-of-revenue system. We will show 
that while a social planner can secure a second-best optimum under profit sharing by proper 
choice of quota and liability allocation, only full employee liability ensures the same with 
revenue sharing. Assume that depending on which share system we consider, the employees 
receive at least a fraction 1 of the firm’s expected profit or a fraction 2  of the firm’s revenue. 
                                                     
13 Note that since the employees, just like the firms, are myopic decision makers, they do not take into account 
the future availability of fish (or the shadow price of the resource constraint). 
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In both cases, either the agent’s participation constraint (4) or the wage scheme must bind. Let 
us assume the wage scheme binds. Then, under profit and revenue sharing, respectively, we 
have that: 
          1, 1 , ,Lt It t Lt It Lt It t ItW h h p h h c h h x F h           (22) 
     2,Lt It t Lt ItW h h p h h  .  (23) 
 
In line with our analysis of the base model, the firm remunerates the employees based on both 
legal and illegal harvesting. In the case of profit sharing, this implies that the wage function 
includes the firm’s expected penalty,  t ItF h . The difference between the share-of-profit and 
share-of-revenue systems is that the latter does not include the firm’s costs, and hence, allows 
for no shifting of costs between the principal and the agent. 
The wage functions (22) and (23) can be substituted into the firm’s profit function (2). 
However, since the share systems leaves the firm with only one choice variable, the profit- and 
revenue-sharing parameters 1  and 2 , respectively, the firm cannot dictate the harvest levels 
of the employees. To see this, note that the sharing parameters enter linearly into both the 
agent’s and the principal’s optimization problems, regardless of the share system. Hence, the 
firm can only use the share parameter to influence whether the employees work on-board the 
vessel, but cannot use the wage incentive to influence their harvesting efforts. It follows that it 
will be optimal for the firm to pay its employees the lowest possible share that ensures that 
they will work on-board the vessel, as given by the participation constraint (4), while it can 
only hope the employees will harvest close to the desired quantity.  
With the employees determining legal and illegal landings, we must consider their decisions 
when deriving the conditions for optimal quotas and liability. The Lagrange function of the 
representative agent’s optimization problem, given that the participation constraint holds, is the 
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same as in the base model (7), but with the share wage functions (22) or (23), replacing the 
flexible wage function  ,Lt ItW h h . 
We can now use the employees’ optimality conditions, equations (20) and (21), to determine 
Lth  and Ith . Specifically, we can derive a reaction function, ( , , )It It t th h Q x , from the 
optimality conditions of the employees for each of the two sharing rules. Although these 
reaction functions will differ from the one we derived for the firm above based on the base 
model, it is straightforward to show that given the properties of the harvest cost and the penalty 
functions, the reaction function must satisfy: 0It
t
h
x



, 0It
h




, and 0It
t
h
Q



. These properties 
match the properties of the reaction function derived for the base model, and hence, as in 
section 2, we must have that 0
t
E
x



, 0
t
E
Q



, and 0
It
E
h



.14 This implies that we can 
compare the private outcomes to the social planner optimum given by equations (13) and (14), 
even though the underlying enforcement cost functions differ. 
Let us now consider the optimal selection of policy instruments for the share-of profit case. 
Comparing the private and social optimality conditions in this case yields the following 
conditions:  
      1 11 1 1t t
Lt Lt
E c
u p
h h
   
 
      
 
  (24) 
          1 1 1, , ( ) ( ) 1 1 1t Lt It t It It
It It
E c
h h x F h G h p
h h
     
 
        
 
 , (25) 
                                                     
14 Detailed derivation of both the reaction function and enforcement cost function and their properties are available 
in the appendix. 
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where we in (25) have used that from the perspective of the social planner, 
 ( , , )Lt It th h x      , ,Lt It th h x , as in the base model. Doing the same comparison for the 
share-of-revenue case yields:  
    21 1t t t
Lt Lt
E c
u p
h h
  
 
     
 
  (26) 
      2( , , ) 1 1t Lt It t t It t
It It
E c
h h x G h p
h h
   
      
 
. (27) 
 
Due to wage frictions between the firm and the employees, the optimal policy conditions for 
the two sharing rules, represent second-best solutions. Let us start out by considering the 
optimal quota policies for the two sharing rules. Recall that in the base model, the optimal 
quota condition stated that the private shadow price of the quota should equal the marginal 
enforcement cost plus the marginal cost of the dynamic stock externality (equation (16)). 
However, when a sharing rule determines wages, two additional terms enter into the optimal 
quota condition (equations (24) and (26)): the marginal revenue and marginal costs of the firm. 
We must include these terms because there is no mechanism for transferring the relevant costs 
and benefits from firm to employees. The wage friction causes an externality where the 
employees ignore the effect of their harvesting choices on the firm. Thus, the social planner 
chooses quotas and fines to internalize this externality. There is one difference between the 
optimal quota policies under profit sharing (24) and revenue sharing (26). With profit sharing, 
the social planner only correct for a share 11   of the marginal harvesting cost of the firm, 
since profit sharing already shifts a share 1  of the firm’s harvesting costs to the employees, 
while we correct for the full marginal cost in the revenue-sharing case.  
Let us now turn to the optimality conditions for illegal landings (enforcement), as given by 
equations (25) and (27). In the base model, the optimality condition for illegal landings states 
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that the marginal enforcement cost plus the marginal cost of the dynamic stock externality 
should equal the marginal expected penalties of firm and employees (equation (16)). Again, 
with the wage frictions introduced by the sharing rules, the social planner must correct for the 
fact that the employees do not take into account the implications of their harvesting decision 
for the firm. In this case, two additional terms enter into the optimal enforcement condition, 
representing the firm’s shares of marginal revenue and marginal costs. In addition, the marginal 
expected penalty that enters into the condition depends on which of the two sharing rules we 
consider. With profit sharing, the optimal enforcement condition (25) includes the marginal 
expected penalty paid by the employees directly,  ItG h , and indirectly through the wage 
function,  1 ItF h  , while with revenue sharing, condition (27) only includes the marginal 
expected penalty of the employee. As for the optimal quota conditions, we can explain these 
differences by the differences in underlying wage functions, and hence, for both the optimal 
quotas and fines, the optimal policy shifts the relevant costs from the principal to the decision-
making agent. From (12) we know that t is non-constant over time, and so the optimal 
enforcement and fine policies given by (25) and (27) must also vary over time. 
Let us now investigate the implications of liability allocation between firm and employees. 
With revenue sharing, the optimal enforcement condition (27) contains the expected penalty 
function of the employee but not the firm. This implies that only full employee liability can 
ensure a second-best optimum. With profit sharing, the social planner can ensure a second-best 
optimum given by equations (24) and (25), regardless of liability allocation. While the 
optimality condition for quota (24) is unaffected by the allocation of liability, this is not the 
case for the optimality condition for enforcement (25). With mixed liability the optimal 
enforcement policy is given by equation (25), the term  ItG h  drops out of (25) with full firm 
liability, and the term  ItF h  drops out with full employee liability. Hence, the optimal quota 
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and enforcement policy might differ depending on whether the enforcement system penalizes 
the firm, the employee, or both for illegal landings.  
Let us finally consider the special case when the firm cannot shift expected penalties to its 
employees. This implies that the wage function in (22) cannot include the term  ItF h . This 
only changes the liability analysis for the share-of-profit case. Without the ability to shift a part 
of the expected fine to the employees under profit sharing, only employee liability ensures a 
second-best optimum. To see this, note that condition (24) is unchanged while ( )ItF h   drops 
out of equation (25). Hence, firm liability cannot work. However, ( )ItG h is included in 
equation (25), and so employee liability can secure a second-best optimum. When the firm 
cannot shift the expected fine to the employees, the employees do not consider ( )ItF h   when 
making decisions about illegal landings. Hence, changes in the firm’s expected fine will not 
affect the level of illegal landings.  
In this section, we have shown that both the share-of-profit and the share-of-revenue rules can 
ensure a second-best optimum. However, while the allocation of liability does not matter with 
a share-of-profit rule, only agent liability yields the efficient outcome with a share-of-revenue 
rule. Hence, a sharing rule that allows the firm to share both costs and revenues with the 
employee makes it less critical which liability scheme the industry faces.  
 
3.2 Limited assets 
In the base model, we assume that firm and employees have unlimited assets. However, in 
reality both parties may face an upper limit on the fines they are able to pay, and this might 
change the optimal punishment and cause inefficiencies. Therefore, we now analyze the 
implications of asset limitations for both firm and employees, and discuss indemnification 
clauses for the employees within the modeling framework from section 2.   
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Let tV  and tL  denote the financial assets available to the employees and the firm, respectively, 
at time t . Introducing an asset constraint for the employees implies that the fine must fulfill the 
condition: 
 
 ( ) ( , ) ( , , )It Lt It Lt It t tG h W h h c h h x V    , (28) 
 
Note that in condition (28) the actual penalty rather than the expected penalty enters (see 
section 2). When interpreting equation (28), we distinguish between two cases characterized 
by whether the firm can offer the employee an indemnification clause. With an indemnification 
clause the firm covers any fines paid by the employee for illegal harvesting. Therefore, 
condition (28) is non-binding, and because ( ) ( )It ItG h G h , the analysis from section 2 
applies. Hence, with indemnification clauses, the manager can ensure a first-best optimum with 
all liability rules. Thus, provided the firm does not have a binding asset constraint, an 
indemnification clause is optimal in fisheries.15 Turning to the case without indemnification 
clauses, full employee liability cannot secure a first-best optimum once the penalty exceeds the 
employee’s asset constraint. This result holds even with full wage flexibility as the firm only 
can compensate the employees for the expected fine, not for the actual fine. However, full firm 
liability will work since the firm does not face a binding asset restriction. Turning to mixed 
liability, equations (15), (28) and (29) determine the outcome provided the employees’ asset 
restriction in (28) is binding. In this case, increasing the employees’ fine, ( )ItG h , beyond the 
level characterized by condition (28) has no deterrence effect. Hence, once the asset constraint 
in equation (28) binds, a further increase in the employees’ formal fine does not increase the 
                                                     
15 A similar result is reached in a general cooperate crime model by Kornhauser (1982).  
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actual fine payment, and therefore, we have that ( ) 0ItG h  . Next, we can find the firm’s fine 
from condition (16) with ( ) 0ItG h  , which yields: 
  , , ( )It Lt t It t
It
E
h h x F h
h
 

  

  (29) 
Hence, equations (28) and (29) determine the second-best optimal enforcement policy with 
mixed liability, while equation (15) determines the optimal quota.  
Similarly, with a binding asset constraint for the firm, the optimal enforcement policy must 
satisfy the following two conditions: 
 ( ) ( ) (1 ) ( , , ) ( , )It Lt It LT It t LT It tF h p h h c h h x W h h L       , (30) 
 ( , , ) ( )Lt It t It t
It
E
h h x G h
h
 

  

 . (31) 
Note first that if the actual penalty can be shifted from the firm to the employee, condition (31) 
never binds, which means that it does not matter who is held liable (see section 2). Next, if the 
firm cannot shift the fine to the employee, which is perhaps the more plausible case for the 
fishing industry,  full employee liability will still work, since this case is unaffected by the asset 
constraint of the firm. With full firm liability, the fine should be set to the maximum allowed 
by the asset constraint (30), but this will generally not yield the optimal solution. However, 
under mixed liability, we can achieve a second-best optimum by ensuring that equations (30) 
and (31) hold simultaneously along with the optimal quota condition (15). 
Finally, if both firm and employees face binding asset constraints, equations (28) and (30) 
determine the fines. In this case, the fines will be too low to ensure the social optimum 
regardless of indemnification clauses or wage contracts, and hence, irrespective of liability rule 
(firm, employee, or mixed) the social planner cannot secure an optimum. Thus, in situations 
where the firm and employees have limited assets, we can conclude that enforcement policies 
are ineffective. We have seen examples of this in real-world fisheries, for example in cases 
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when owners of "flag of convenience" vessels arrested for illegal fishing abandon their vessel 
rather than paying the fines (Agnew, 2000).  
         
4. Concluding Remarks 
The purpose of this paper was to analyze how the allocation of liability between fishing firms 
and their crew affects quota violations and the ability to design a socially efficient fisheries 
policy. Contrary to the existing fisheries economics literature on enforcement, which typically 
treats the fishing firm or vessel as one individual decision maker, we model noncompliance in 
a principal-agent framework where the firm and its crew may have conflicting interests. 
Relative to the previous fisheries economic enforcement literature, this enables us to investigate 
new factors and relationships that affect regulatory compliance in fisheries. 
We develop a model in which the firm receives the revenues from the fish landed by its vessel. 
The crew, on the other hand, operates the vessel and make the harvesting decisions. Hence, 
while only the firm benefits directly from quota violations, the crew make the decision of 
whether and how much to violate. The firm must therefore use the compensation scheme to 
induce the crew to act in its best interest, which may include landing fish illegally. To consider 
the implication of different liability allocation rules, we investigate the incentive structure 
between the firm and the crew. Without wage frictions, the firm can induce the crew to land 
any given quantity through the compensation scheme. This makes the firm the real decision 
maker, and hence, holding the firm liable for quota violations can yield the socially optimal 
outcome. However, in the absence of wage frictions, we can achieve the same with full crew 
liability, or with a combination of firm and crew liability. The reason is that when the firm can 
shift all relevant benefits and costs, including expected fines, between it-self and the crew and 
it is thus irrelevant who is (formally) held liable for illegal activities.  
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The irrelevance result for the allocation of liability in the absence of wage frictions, is in line 
with the environmental economic literature on liability. However, while studies on liability in 
the setting of environmental regulations consider a static flow externality, we investigate the 
implications of a dynamic stock externality. This externality expresses that neither the crew 
nor the firm takes the future availability of fish into account when making harvest decisions. 
The marginal cost of this dynamic stock externality depends on the current size of the resource 
stock, and will therefore change over time unless the fishery reaches a steady-state equilibrium. 
This implies that the optimal enforcement policy also changes over time. Hence, extending the 
liability result to the case of fisheries and other renewable resources represents a novel 
contribution to this literature.  
Next, we introduce wage frictions by analyzing the share system of remuneration, which is 
commonly used in fisheries. We show that when there are wage frictions that restricts the firm 
from shifting relevant benefits and costs to/from the employees, the liability irrelevance result 
might break down. We consider two specific constraints on the wage function; the share-of-
profit and the share-of-revenue systems of remuneration. Both sharing rules severely restricts 
the ability of the firm to influence the employees’ harvesting behavior through the wage. We 
show that only agent liability can guarantee a second-best optimum under revenue sharing and 
under profit sharing when penalties cannot be shifted from the firm to the employee. Finally, 
we analyze the implications of the firm and the employees facing financial constraints that limit 
how large actual fine payments they can make. Perhaps not surprisingly, this restricts who can 
be held liable and to what extent, which may reduce our ability to ensure an efficient solution. 
Our results show that with the proper selection of quotas, fines, and liability rules, one can 
reach the socially optimal outcome in almost every case we have investigated. However, in 
most fisheries, as in other industries, the allocation of liability for regulatory violations is not 
the choice of a regulator (or social planner) but rather determined by the legal system. Thus, 
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we do not intend to provide policy advice in terms of optimal liability rules in this paper, but 
instead we point out some relationships between liability, enforcement, and quotas, on the one 
hand, and quota violations, on the other.  
Although we analyze for the case of fisheries, the results in the paper generalize beyond the 
fisheries case in two ways. First, we study the case when the firm rather than the employees 
benefits directly from illegal behavior.  The employees, on the contrary, can only benefit 
through the compensation scheme. With few exceptions, the existing liability literature focuses 
instead on the case in which the employees and not the firm directly benefits from violations. 
For many renewable resources (e.g. water and forestry) and environmental externalities (e.g. 
illegal waste dumping), the setup in which the firm benefits from the violation gives a more 
accurate representation of the realities. Second, we consider a dynamic stock externality, which 
is highly relevant for a number of environmental problems, such as problems involving 
damaging pollution stocks (e.g. CO2, NOx, and particulate matter).  As we have shown in this 
paper, such problems require enforcement policies that evolve over time with the current stock 
of the pollution stock, and thus the shadow price of pollution.  
The introduction of principal-agent theory into the analysis of non-compliance in fisheries 
offers many possibilities for future work. One such possibility is to consider the effect of 
various risk attitudes on the behavior of the firm and the crew. In the current paper, we assume 
that everyone is risk neutral. The results might change if firm and crew are risk averse, or if for 
example individual crew members are more risk averse than the firm. Incorporating moral 
hazard between the firm and the crew might also yield new insights.   
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APPENDIX 
Appendix A: The basic model 
A.1. Reaction functions 
In this section, we derive and characterize the reaction functions presented and analyzed in the paper. 
 
From the main text, the cost function satisfies the following properties: 
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In addition, the properties of the penalty functions are: 
 '( ) 0ItG h  , ''( ) 0ItG h  , '( ) 0ItF h  , ''( ) 0ItF h     (A2) 
From section 2.1, we have the following first-order conditions for the private optimum: 
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   Lt th Q     (A5) 
We can express the equation system (A3)-(A5) as the reaction function presented in the main text: 
 ( , , )It It t th h Q x      (A6) 
Total differentiating (A3)-(A5) yields the following: 
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Lt tdh dQ        (A9) 
Inserting equation (A9) into (A7) and (A8) yields: 
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Note that equation (A11) only depends on Itdh . Using this equation, we can now find 
It
t
dh
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 by setting 
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In (A12), the denominator is positive because 0 1  , 
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, ''( ) 0ItF h  , and ''( )ItG h  (cf. equations 
(A1) and (A2)). From (A1) we also have that 
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Turning to It
dh
d
, we set 0t tdx dQ   in (A11) and obtain: 
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The denominator is identical to the one in equation (A12), and is thus positive, and from (A2) we have that 
'( )ItG h > 0 and '( )ItF h >0. Consequently, we find that 0
Itdh
d
 .  
Let us finally determine the effect of quota on illegal harvest. We let 0td dx    in (A11), and arrive at: 
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From before, we know that both the denominator and the numerator are positive, since 
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t
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A.2 Enforcement costs 
In this section, we derive and characterize the enforcement cost function used in the paper. 
 
We start out by inverting the reaction function in (A6), which yields: 
 ( , , )t t ItQ x h                             (A15) 
Total differentiating (A15) produces: 
 0t t It
t It
dQ dx dh
Q x h
    
  
  
                      (A16) 
Next, we define the probability of being detected as a function of enforcement effort, ( )te , and we assume 
that: 
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Note that we can invert ( )te  to yield ( )te  , and because of (A17) we obtain the following: 
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Substituting the inverted reaction function into ( )te   gives ( ( , , ))t t t t Ite e Q x h  ( , , )t t ItQ x h . Now, we 
want to find the sign of the derivatives of ( , , )t t ItQ x h . First, we investigate the sign of 
Ith


by using:     
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Setting dxt = 0 in (A16) and solving for 
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Let us next turn to the enforcement cost function, ( )tK e . We assume that: 
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From above ( ( , , ))t t t t Ite e Q x h  ( , , )t t ItQ x h and inserting this into the enforcement cost function gives 
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derivatives of the enforcement cost function, and we start by considering 
t
E
Q


: 
 t
t t t t
eE F K
Q Q e Q
 
 
    
 
     
                      (A26) 
From (A23), 0t
t t
e
Q Q
 

 
 
  
, and from (A25) we have that 0
t
K
e



, which implies that 0
t
E
Q



. 
Next, for 
t
E
x


we have that: 
 t
t t t t
eE F K
x x e x
 
 
    
 
     
                      (A27) 
39 
 
Using (A21), we have that 0t
t t
e
x x
 

 
 
  
, and according to (A25), 0
t
K
e



, from which it follows that 
0
t
E
x



. 
Finally, for 
It
E
h


we get: 
  t
It It t It
eE F K
h h e h
 
 
    
 
     
                      (A28) 
From (A19) we know that 0t
It It
e
h h
 

 
 
  
, and using (A23) we have that 0
t
K
e



. This implies that 
0
It
E
h



. 
  
40 
 
Appendix B: Share of profit 
B.1. Reaction functions 
From section 3 we have the following first-order conditions: 
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We also have the following wage scheme from section 3: 
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From the wage scheme in (B4) we may obtain: 
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(B5) can be substituted into (B1) and (B6) into (B2). This gives the following rewritten first-order conditions: 
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(B7) - (B9) may be total differentiated which gives: 
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(B12) can be substituted into (B10) and (B11) which gives: 
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Itdh is the only variable that enters in (B14) and, therefore, (B14) can be used to characterize the reaction 
function.  
In (B14) we may set 0td dx   and reach: 
It
t
dh
dQ
  
2
2
2
( (1 ) )
( (1 ) ) ( ´´ ( ) ´´ ( ))
It Lt
It It
It
c
h h
c
F h G h
h
  
    

 
 


   

            (B15) 
42 
 
We have that 0 1  , 0 1  , 0 1  ,
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denominator in (B15) is positive. With respect to the nominator
2
It Lt
c
h h

 
>0 so the nominator is also positive. 
In total, we, therefore, reach the conclusion that 0It
t
dh
dQ
 .  
Concerning It
dh
d
we set 0t tdQ dx  in (B14) and arrive at: 
 
2
2
(´ ) (´ )
( (1 ) ) ( ´´ ( ) ´´ ( ))
It It It
It It
It
dh F h G h
cd
F h G h
h


    

 

   

             (B16) 
From (B15) we have that the denominator is positive and, in addition, the nominator in (B16) is positive 
because ´( ) 0ItG h  and ´( ) 0ItF h  . Therefore, we obtain that 0
Itdh
d
 .  
Last, by setting 0tdQ d  we reach: 
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             (B17) 
From above the denominator is positive. In addition, we have that 
2
0
It t
c
h x


 
so the nominator is negative. In 
total, this implies that 0It
t
h
x



. 
B.2. Enforcement costs 
The inverted reaction function is:  
 ( , , )t t ItQ x h                        (B18) 
From (B18) we get:  
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 0t t It
t It
dQ dx dh
Q x h
    
  
  
               (B19) 
Now ( )te is the probability of being detected as a function of enforcement effort and we have: 
 0
te



                (B20) 
We invert ( )te to get ( )te   and due to (B20) we obtain: 
1
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e
e
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
 
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
                 (B21) 
( , , )t t ItQ x h   can be used in ( )te  and this gives ( ( , , ))t t t t Ite e Q x h  ( , , )t t ItQ x h . Now we can find 
the sign of
Ith


by using:     
   
t
It It
e
h h
 

 

  
               (B22) 
From (B21) 0t
e




 and furthermore we have that: 
 
1
ItIt
hh






                (B23) 
From (B16)  0It
h




 and by using this in (B23) we obtain 0
Ith



. Now (B22) now imply that 0
Ith



.  
For the sign of
tx


 we have: 
t
t t
e
x x
 

 

  
               (B24) 
In (B21) it was stated that 0t
e




 and using by dQt = 0 in (B19) it is obtained that: 
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                (B25) 
From (B17) 0It
t
h
x



, and in (B16) we reached that 0It
h




. Combining this in (B25) 0
tx



, which by 
using (B24) gives 0
tx



.  
Lastly, we turn attention to the sign of
tQ


where we have: 
t
t t
e
Q Q
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              (B26) 
Using dxt = 0 in (B19) and solving for 
tQ


we get:  
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                      (B27) 
From (B16) 0It
h




and using (B15) implies that 0It
t
h
Q



. Therefore, 0
tQ



and by using this in (B26) it 
follows that 0
tQ



. 
Now the enforcement cost function is given as ( )tK e  and we assume that: 
 0
t
K
e



 and 
2
2
0
t
K
e



              (B28) 
From before ( ( , , ))t t t t Ite e Q x h  ( , , )t t ItQ x h and inserting this in the enforcement cost function gives 
( ( ( , , )))t t t ItK e Q x h = ( ( , , )) ( , , )t t It t t ItF Q x h E Q x h  . Now we can find the sign of the derivatives and we 
start by 
t
E
Q


 where we have: 
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In (B26) 0t
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e
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 

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  
and from (B28) 0
t
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implying that 0
t
E
Q
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
. 
Next for the sign of
t
E
x


we have that: 
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Using (B24) we have that 0t
t t
e
x x
 

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 
  
and from (B28) 0
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which implies that 0
t
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. 
Last for the sign of 
It
E
h


we get: 
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From (B22) 0t
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
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and using (B28) 0
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. In total, this implies that 0
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. 
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Appendix C: Share of revenue 
C.1. Reaction functions 
With the share of revenue rule the wage function is: 
    ,Lt It t Lt ItW h h p h h       (C1) 
The general first-order conditions for the employee are given by (C1)-(C3) in appendix B.1. Inserting the 
derivatives of (C1) in the first-order conditions gives: 
  
 0t
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c
p u
h
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
     (C2) 
 ´ 0It
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c
p G h
h
 
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  

     (C3) 
Lt th Q       (C4) 
By total differentiating (C2) - (C4) we get that: 
2 2 2
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  (C6) 
Lt tdh dQ       (C7) 
(C7) can be inserted into (C5) and (C6) which yields: 
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  (C9) 
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Since (C9) only depend on Itdh , this equation is the one we will consider to derive the properties of the reaction 
function.  
First, we investigate the sign of It
t
h
dQ

 and by setting 0td dx    in (C9) we reach: 
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                (C10) 
Concerning (C10) 0 1  0 1 
2
2
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

and ´´ ( ) 0ItG h   so the denominator is positive. The 
nominator is also positive because 
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
 
. In total, (C10) therefore imply that 0It
t
h
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 .  
Setting 0td dQ   in (C9) gives: 
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As in (C10) the denominator is positive. However, now
2
0
It t
c
h x


 
so the nominator is negative and this imply 
that 0It
t
h
dx

 .  
Last, we evaluate the sign of It
h
d

by setting 0t tdx dQ  in (C9). This gives: 
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The denominator is positive from (C10) and the nominator is also positive because ´( ) 0ItG h  . This implies 
that 0It
h
d

 . 
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C.2. Enforcement costs 
As before we have an inverted the reaction function given by: 
 ( , , )t t ItQ x h              (C13) 
(C13) can be total differentiating:  
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            (C14) 
Now the probability of being detected is defined as ( )te and we have that: 
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


             (C15) 
From ( )te we get ( )te   and because of (C15) we have that: 
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(C13) can be substituted into ( )te  to obtain ( ( , , ))t t t t Ite e Q x h  ( , , )t t ItQ x h . Now we want to find the 
sign of the derivatives of ( , , )t t ItQ x h . First, we consider the sign of 
Ith


:     
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From (C16) it is obtained that 0t
e




. Furthermore, we have: 
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(C12) imply that 0It
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, and therefore we have that 0
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

 by using (C18). Now (C17) implies that 
0
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 Concerning the sign of 
tx


 we get that: 
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(C16) express that 0t
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By setting dxt = 0 in (C14) we get:  
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Now the enforcement cost function is given as ( )tK e  and we assume that: 
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Now we have that ( ( , , ))t t t t Ite e Q x h  ( , , )t t ItQ x h and inserting this in the enforcement cost function 
gives ( ( ( , , )))t t t ItK e Q x h = ( ( , , )) ( , , )t t It t t ItF Q x h E Q x h  . Now we can find the sign of the derivatives 
of the enforcement cost function and we start by the sign of
t
E
Q


 where we have: 
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